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Comment
Piercing The Shield: Reporter Privilege
in Minnesota Following State v. Turner
Nancy V. Mate*
On October 11, 1995, a St. Paul Pioneer Press photographer
accompanied two city police officers on their night rounds,
hoping to get pictures to illustrate the newspaper's special series on local crime.' One of the pictures the photographer took
that night appeared later on the front page of the newspaper.2
Others, the ones not selected for publication, ended up nine
months later as the basis of a state supreme court decision that
significantly altered the fundamental relationship that had
existed for the past quarter of a century between the media
and the courts in the state of Minnesota.
The events that occurred that autumn night during the
police ride-along appeared routine. The officers arrested a man
for possession of what they believed was crack cocaine and
later charged him with a violation of the Controlled Substance
Law.3 The man's defense attorney contested the arrest at a
preliminary hearing, claiming his client's Fourth Amendment
rights were violated because the officers lacked probable cause
to stop his client. 4 When the attorney discovered that a newspaper photographer had been present at the time of the arrest,
he subpoenaed the photographer to appear at the hearing and
produce all photographs, both published and unpublished,
taken at the scene of the arrest.5 The subpoena was later
broadened to include all notes and photographs gathered by
the newspaper for the entire series that might relate to the
* J.D. Candidate 1999, University of Minnesota Law School; M.A. 1972,
BA. 1965, University of Michigan.
1. See State v. Turner, 550 N.W.2d 622, 624 (Minn. 1996).
2. See ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 15, 1995, at 1.
3. See Turner, 550 N.W.2d at 624.

4. See id.
5. See id. at 624-25.
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particular officers involved in the arrest.6 The newspaper responded by filing a motion to quash, based on reporter privilege under the First Amendment, the state constitution, and
the Minnesota Shield Law.
At issue was the conflict between the court's right to the
best evidence and a reporter's qualified privilege to ensure the
free flow of information to the public and freedom of the press.
Whether courts should recognize a constitutional basis for reporter privilege has been the focus of much debate throughout
the country over the past quarter century since the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg v. Hayes,' which held that
a reporter could be compelled to testify before a grand jury
conducting a criminal investigation. The Minnesota Free Flow
of Information Act,9 often called the Minnesota Shield Law,
was passed by the legislature shortly after the Branzburg decision and provided limited statutory protection to the press. 0
But in 1996, State v. Turner changed the rules for reporters in
Minnesota.
For over twenty years, Minnesota's Shield Law had been
regarded as one of the most liberal in the country," protecting
the press from forced disclosure of confidential information and
unpublished, nonconfidential material, such as notes, unused
photographs and video, documents and early drafts of stories,
in the absence of a threshold showing. The Turner court held,
however, that the Shield Law provides only very narrow protection for reporters. 2 Furthermore, the court declined to find
any greater protection for the press under the First Amendment or the state constitution. 3 In this abrupt about-face,
Minnesota became one of the states with the least protection
for the press on either statutory or constitutional grounds. 4

6. See id. at 625.
7. See id.
8. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
9. MINN. STAT. §§ 595.021-595.025 (1996).
10. See infra note 167 (providing text of law).
11. Interviews with Mark Anfinson, Esq., attorney for The Minnesota
Newspaper Association, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Oct. 10, 1997); Lucy Dalglish,
Esq., Dorsey & Whitney, former President of the Minnesota Chapter of the
Society of Professional Journalists (Oct. 23, 1997); Paul Hannah, Esq., attorney for St. Paul Pioneer Press, KTCA Television, KSTP Television, WCCO
Television (March 6, 1998) [hereinafter Interviews].
.12. See Turner,550 N.W.2d at 624.
13. See id.
14. See Interviews, supra note 11 (Mark Anfinson, Lucy Dalglish, Paul
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This decision has dramatically broadened the opportunities for
both the government and defense attorneys to have access to
reporter information and work product.15 While the immediate
impact of Turner is unclear, the holding engenders criticism
and concern from those who believe the lack of protection will
interfere with the free flow of information to the public.t
This Comment critically examines the State v. Turner decision and its impact on reporter privilege under both the state
Shield Law and the First Amendment. Part I traces the development of reporter privilege and the policy considerations beHannah).
15. Hennepin County Attorney Mike Freeman has said he now considers
that an "ethical prosecutor has an obligation" to seek nonconfidential media
material and testimony from the media. See Michael 0. Freeman, Was Justice Served by Minnesota Daily Actions?, ST. PAUL PIONEER PREss, Feb. 6,
1996, at 7A.
t Since this Comment was written, the Minnesota Legislature amended
the state Shield Law, incorporating some of the changes recommended infra
Part I. The amended statute now specifically provides a qualified privilege
for reporters who wish to protect unpublished sources and information
whether or not the information was obtained in confidence. Parties wishing to
compel disclosure must meet the following conditions by clear and convincing
evidence:
(1) that there is probable cause to believe that the specific information sought (i) is clearly relevant to a gross misdemeanor or felony, or
(ii) is dearly relevant to a misdemeanor so long as the information
would not tend to identify the source of the information or the means
through which it was obtained, (2) that the information cannot be obtained by any alternative means or remedies less destructive of first
amendment rights, and (3) that there is a compelling and overriding
interest requiring the disclosure of the information where the disclosure is necessary to prevent injustice.
MINN. STAT. §§ 595.024 (1998). How effective these changes will be at protecting reporter work product while allowing the shield to be pierced to avoid
injustice awaits the outcome of new challenges in the courts.
The statutory change does not, of course, alter the constitutional interpretation of the Turner court, as discussed infra Part IH.A It also does not
address the standards advocated in this paper for in camera review. See Part
mI.A4. These issues will continue to arise in Minnesota as well as other
states as courts seek to weigh the competing constitutional considerations
that arise in a rapidly changing media environment. As this Comment suggests, questions of what constitutes an undue burden on newsgathering need
to account for changes away from a focus merely on protecting confidential
sources. The increased reliance on media subpoenas by prosecutors and defense attorneys, as well as their vastly enlarged scope, pose additional burdens, such as an intrusion on the editorial process and a loss of perceived neutrality. But the inquiry is not limited to that. As technological changes, such
as the Internet, alter traditional definitions of what constitutes a "reporter,"
or a "publisher," and provide new jurisdictional dilemmas that expand the
boundaries of geography and traditional media delivery systems, the debate
will become even more complex.
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hind the protection. Part II outlines the holding and reasoning
of the Turner decision. Part I compares the constitutional
analysis of Turner with other courts' opinions, and examines
the statutory interpretation of the Minnesota Shield Law. This
Comment argues that State v. Turner was wrongly decided,
based both on policy considerations and on statutory interpretation. It concludes with a proposal for changes in the Shield
Law that would restore greater protection for reporters, while
still allowing disclosure when needed to prevent injustice.
I.

PROTECTIONS OF THE MEDIA AND THE
REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE

A. THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN THE UNITED STATES
The framers of the U.S. Constitution held a fundamental
conviction that open and free communication was essential to
the successful workings of a democracy. 6 Since the electorate
was to be responsible for making decisions about the workings
of government, voters needed to be informed of the issues and
the positions of their representatives, and to participate in discussions about these choices. "'Apopular Government without
popular information, or the means of acquiring it,' wrote James
Madison, 'is but a prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy....
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who
mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with
the power which knowledge gives.'"'7 As important as town
meetings were in colonial days, they were not sufficient to
communicate information and ideas between the colonies. The
press and other printed treatises filled this void. 8
16. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) ("Those who
won our independence believed... that public discussion is a political duty;
and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government."). The First Amendment in the Bill of Rights was designed to protect
the freedom of speech, religion, assembly, and the press. See U.S. CONST.
amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press."). The role of speech in effective democratic governance is but
one of the purposes for the First Amendment attributed to the founding fathers. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERiCAN CONsTITuTIoNAL LAW § 12-1, at

785-89 (2d ed. 1988).
17. Sam J. Ervin, In Pursuit of a Press Privilege, 11 HARV. J. ON LEGiS.

233, 234 (1974) (quoting 9 WRITING OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Hunt ed., 1910)

(letter to W.T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1822)).
18. A free press was a means of ensuring free speech. See id. ("[Tihe first
amendment unquestionably contemplates the press as an informational link
between the people and their government."); see also Riley v. City of Chester,
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As the country grew in size and complexity, the role of the
press became even more crucial. The words of the Supreme
Court in 1931 seem prophetic when considered as they apply
today:
[Tihe administration of government has become more complex, the
opportunities for malfeasance and corruption have multiplied, crime
has grown to most serious proportions, and the danger of its protection by unfaithful officials and of the impairment of the fimdamental
security of life and property by criminal alliances and official neglect,
emphasizes the primary need of a vigilant and courageous press, especially in great cities.'9

While the press still informs the public about numerous
aspects of our daily life, it continues to bear the responsibility
of uncovering and reporting governmental corruption and
abuse so that an informed public may shape, control, or correct
the problems as it chooses."0

B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROTECTION FOR THE PRESS
The role of the press as a watchdog of government gave
rise to the concern that reporters needed special protections.
Historically, the constitutional concerns regarding freedom of
the press focused on prior restraint and censorship.2' But other
types of interference with the press's ability to publish have
been scrutinized for their constitutional implications.2 "Undue
restraints" on the press can include intrusion into the editorial
process, interference in press neutrality, and placing costly and
time-consuming requirements that rise to a level of burdensomeness.2
Early conflicts between the press and government often
took the form of threats to jail reporters who refused to name
24
confidential sources in stories critical of the government.
Confidential sources became important not only in reporting on
the government, but also in other stories of public concern
where a source feared public exposure.2 Reporters were reluctant to reveal their confidential sources due to concern about a
"chilling effect" on future stories that might not get reported if
sources no longer trusted reporters' assurances of confidentiality.' Generally, the courts allowed no testimonial exception for
reporters,27 though some commentators note the impact was

612 F.2d 708, 714 (3d Cir. 1979) ("The role of 'an untrammeled press as a vital
source of public information', was one of the primary bases for its First
Amendment protection.") (citation omitted).
19. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 719-20 (1931).
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lessened when courts declined to vigorously enforce their own
orders to jail reporters."
Some states responded to the jailing of reporters by passing
laws that excused journalists from compelled disclosure of confidential information in certain circumstances. Maryland became the first state to pass a shield law in 1896, giving limited
testimonial privilege to members of the press.2" In response to
several well-publicized jailings of reporters who refused to reveal their sources,3" ten other states" adopted shield laws be20. As the Supreme Court has noted, the First Amendment served to
avoid governmental suppression of its own embarrassing or illegal activities.
See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723-24 (1971) ("The
dominant purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the widespread
practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing information.... [The
First Amendment was adopted against the widespread use of the common law
of seditious libel to punish the dissemination of material that is embarrassing
to the powers-that-be.").
21 See Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 548 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 910 (1958) ("Freedom of the press within the historic meaning of the
First Amendment meant primarily freedom from previous restraints upon
publication and freedom from censorship.").
22. See id. ("[In the domain of indispensable First Amendment liberties,
it is essential 'not to limit the protection of the right to any particular way of
abridging it.' ... '[A]bridgment of such rights, even though unintended, may
inevitably follow from varied forms of governmental action.") (citations omitted).
23. See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing restraints on newsgathering).
24. Benjamin Franklin's brother, for example, narrowly escaped being
jailed by the state assembly for such an incident. See Vincent Blasi, The
Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REv. 229, 229 n.1
(1971) (citing BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN

FRANKLIN 69 (1964)). During the Depression the controversy again surfaced
over reporters protecting confidential sources for stories of political corruption
and labor unrest. See 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM,
JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5426, at 715 (1980).

25. Fear of talking publicly with a reporter can arise for a variety of reasons, for example, fear of losing a job, threats to one's family and self, ostracism by fellow-employees, and fear of self-incrimination.
26. See Blasi, supra note 24, at 262-64.
27. See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 24, § 5426, at 716 & n.22.
28. See id. at 717.
29. The legislation was prompted by the jailing of a Baltimore Sun reporter who refused to reveal how he obtained accurate information on the
proceedings of a grand jury. See C. THOMAS DIENES ET AL., NEWsGATHERiNG

AND THE LAW § 14-1, at 603 (1997).
30. See Duane D. Morse & John W. Zucker, The Journalist'sPrivilege,in
TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES 407, 424 (Scott N. Stone & Ronald S. Liebman eds.,
1983).
31. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Indiana, Kentucky, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.
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tween 1933 and 1941 that provided some form of protection to
reporters against compelled disclosure.
In 1958, a federal court first recognized a qualified constitutional protection for reporters. 2 In a libel case brought by
Judy Garland, a newspaper reporter refused to disclose her
source, claiming protection under the First Amendment for
freedom of the press.33 The court concluded that the circumstances in this case required disclosure and refused to extend
constitutional protection.34 Nevertheless, the court recognized
that the First Amendment guaranteed some unspecified level
of protection to the press from the burdens of compulsory dis-

closure. 5

This case was significant not only for recognizing a qualified
constitutional protection for the press, but also for the early
articulation of a balancing test for weighing the competing constitutional values.36 Compelled disclosure would not be justified where the information was of "doubtful relevance or materiality."3 7 Also, the party seeking disclosure must have first
made efforts to get the information from other sources.3"
In 1970, the Ninth Circuit in Caldwell v. United States39
became the first federal circuit court to extend explicit constitutional protection to the press. Noting there was particular
necessity for a free press during times of civil unrest, the court
recognized the need for reporters to maintain confidentiality in
order to report on unknown and unpopular movements. 40 This
32. See Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 548 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 910.
33. See id. at 547.
34. See id at 550-51.
35. See id. at 548 ("[We accept at the outset the hypothesis that compulsory
disclosure of a journalises confidential sources of information entail an abridgment of press freedom by imposing some limitation upon the availability of
news .... 'Abridgment of such rights, even though unintended, may inevitably
follow from varied forms of governmental action." (citations omitted)).
36. See id. '[Flreedom of the press, precious and vital though it is to a
free society, is not an absolute. What must be determined is whether the interest to be served by compelling the testimony of the witness in the present
case justifies some impairment of this First Amendment freedom." Id.
37. Id. at 549-50. In the case at hand, the Court found that the reporter's
information "went to the heart of the plaintiffs claim." Id. at 550. As such, it
compelled disclosure.
38. See id. at 551.
39. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972).
40. See id. at 1084-85 ("The need for an untrammeled press takes on special urgency in times of widespread protest and dissent. In such times the
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protection, however, was short lived. The Supreme Court reversed
the Caldwell decision in the seminal case involving reporter
protection, Branzburg v. Hayes.4"
The Branzburg decision combined four cases in which reporters, each who had promised confidentiality to sources in
return for information and access, were subpoenaed by grand
juries to disclose that information.4 2 The reporters refused to
testify, claiming reporter privilege under the First Amendment.41 While acknowledging the importance of First Amendment protection for the press," Justice White's plurality held
that journalists did not have an absolute constitutional privilege to refuse to testify before a grand jury. 5 Moreover, the
government was not required to demonstrate a compelling
need in order to require journalists to reveal confidential
sources and information if called by a grand jury.' The Court
found that the public interest in law enforcement and effective
grand jury proceedings outweighed the "uncertain, burden on
news gathering" when journalists are compelled to disclose
confidential information before a grand jury.'

First Amendment protections exist to maintain communication with dissenting groups and to provide the public with a wide range of information about
the nature of protest and heterodoxy.").
41. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
42. See id. at 667-79.
43. The Caldwell case arose out of the investigations of a reporter for The
New York Times, working in California, who was assigned to cover activities
of the Black Panther Party and other black militant organizations. A federal
grand jury subpoenaed him to appear to testify and produce all '[nlotes and
tape recordings of interviews covering the period from January 1, 1969, to
date, reflecting statements made for publication by officers and spokesmen for
the Black Panther Party concerning the aims and purposes of said organization and the activities of said organization." Id. at 675-76 n.12. A second case
involved a Massachusetts television reporter who had been allowed to attend
a meeting of the Black Panthers on the condition that he not report on anything he saw or heard unless an anticipated police raid occurred. See id. at
672. The other two cases arose from the stories of Paul Branzburg, a Kentucky reporter, who wrote an account of two young people he had observed
manufacturing hashish from marijuana, and an article about the use of drugs
in Frankfort, Kentucky. Branzburg had interviewed several dozen drug users
over a period of two weeks to develop his story. See id. at 667-69.
44. See id. at 681 ("We do not question the significance of free speech,
press, or assembly to the country's welfare. Nor is it suggested that news
gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.").
45. See id. at 708-09.
46. See id. at 708.
47. Id. at 690-91.
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In a frequently quoted concurring opinion, Justice Powell
noted the limited nature of the Court's opinion, suggesting the
existence of a qualified reporter privilege under different fact
scenarios.4 He noted that the grand jury's investigation must
be conducted "in good faith," the information sought must fill a
"legitimate need of law enforcement," and not have a "remote
and tenuous" connection to the investigation.4 9 He asserted
that privilege claims should be determined on a case-by-case
basis, balancing conflicting interests and utilizing traditional
methods of adjudication. 0
Despite finding no absolute reporter privilege against
compelled testimony before a grand jury in Branzburg, the
opinions of both Justices White and Powell acknowledged constitutional rights of the press not only in safeguarding sources,
but in the more general endeavor of "news gathering."" By
1972, therefore, there was a recognition of some degree of reporter privilege for confidential sources and other activities
necessary to the newsgathering process.

C. THE AFTERMATH OF BRANZBURG
1. Changes in Scope of Reporter Privilege
Although the Branzburg holding applied only to reporters
who were subpoenaed before a grand jury because they may
have witnessed a crime,52 many thought the decision would be
broadly interpreted to cover other judicial fora and other fact
scenarios. Their fears arose out of the dramatic changes that
had developed during the preceding decade that altered the focus
of reporter protection. In response to the tumultuous activities
of the sixties, the number of subpoenas to media organizations
had increased dramatically as the government sought to discover and prosecute illegal activities of radical groups. 4 The
48. See id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 710.
50. See id.
51. Id. at 681, 707; see also id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring) ("The Court
does not hold that newsmen, subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, are
without constitutional rights with respect to the gathering of news or in safeguarding their sources.").
52. See id. at 708-09.
53. See Ervin, supra note 17, at 240.
54. Senator Sam Ervin provides a particularly fascinating, contemporaneous recounting of the historic forces operating throughout the country in
the sixties that findamentally altered the relationship between the press and
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scope of subpoenas had also broadened from disclosure of confidential sources to broadly written subpoenas for the production of all notes, tapes, draft scripts, and documents used in the
preparation of reports, regardless of whether the information
had been published or broadcast.5 5 Instead of subpoenas issued
for specific evidence in specific crimes, the government also began
using information gathered by the media to uncover possible
illegal activities. 6 Finally, the number and nature of governmental agencies seeking reporter information also increased.
the government. See Ervin, supra note 17, at 243-50. Reporters, trying to
cover the activism of that decade, including radical groups advocating violence, found themselves subject to a rash of subpoenas as the government
sought to uncover illegal activity. From 1969 to mid-1971, NBC and CBS and
their wholly owned affiliates were served with a total of 121 subpoenas,
mostly involving network coverage of militant and anti-war groups, demonstrations and campus disturbances. See id. at 245. The New York Times was
served with twenty-one subpoenas in three years, contrasted with five total in
the preceding four years. See id. As the press relentlessly published information on the war in Vietnam that was contrary to official government reports, the rift widened. Evidence emerged of deliberate attempts by the government to suppress information, and reporters began to recognize they were
being manipulated as conduits of inaccurate government reports. There was a
dramatic increase in classification of documents and a resurgence of an aggressive investigative journalism that contributed to the hostility. Conflicts
between the press and the police also increased during the sixties, culminating in the gassing and beating of reporters and photographers during the 1968
Democratic National Convention. Use of police as undercover informants
posing as reporters exacerbated the conflict. Vice President Agnew's regular
attacks on the press ("nattering nabobs of negativism") both reflected the
tension and contributed to it. See id. at 248-49. Some journalists characterized these changes as fundamentally altering the relationship between the
press and the prosecutor. In testifying before Congress in 1973, the editor of
the Los Angeles Times explained the change in the nature of the relationship
between government and the press:
We always had an understanding... with prosecutors [that] there
were certain things they couldn't ask of us. They couldn't bring us
into court, they couldn't make us serve as an agent of the court, and
they couldn't get hold of our material. When they made feeble efforts
to do so-that is all they were in those days-we told them they were
not going to do it and that was the end of it.
Newsmen's Privilege:Hearings Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong., 1st Sess. 292 (1973), quoted
in Ervin, supra note 17, at 243.
55. See Ervin, supra note 17, at 244-45.
56. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 747-49 & nn.38-39 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (discussing absence of factual showing of commission of crime in Caldwell
grand jury proceeding).
57. In addition to the Justice Department, agencies included, for example,
all levels of courts, boards of education, and state boards of personnel review.
See Letter from William Ware, Chairman of The Freedom of Information
Committee, to Sen. Sam Ervin (Oct. 6, 1971), quoted in Ervin, supra note 17,
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The media perceived these changes as potentially interfering with their access to information and their ability to publish." Finding little support in Branzburg for constitutionally
based reporter privilege, attention turned to guaranteeing
statutory protection at both the federal and state level.
2. Statutory Protection
Efforts to secure statutory protection from Congress
proved unsuccessful. Prior to Branzburg, Senator Thomas
McIntyre of New Hampshire, reacting to what he described as
"the recent wave of broad and sweeping subpoenas which have
issued from the Justice Department," had introduced legislation to create a testimonial privilege for newsmen. 9 Following
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg, many other
bills were introduced in Congress, but, like the McIntyre legislation, none was passed.6" Several factors likely contributed to
the demise of the congressional legislative effort, including the
divided support of the press itself,6" and the newly self-imposed
restraint on the part of the government in issuing subpoenas.62
The perceived need for federal legislation also declined as federal courts began to reinterpret Branzburg as recognizing a
qualified reporter privilege."

at 246.
58. The changes created new instances of "undue restraint" on the media
due to the loss of perceived neutrality, increased governmental intrusion in
the editorial process, and increased burden of time and money arising from
the tremendous increase in quantity and scope of subpoenas, raising questions
of actual interference with the reporters' ability to cover the news.
59. S. 3552, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); see also Ervin, supra note 17, at
251.
60. See Morse & Zucker, supra note 30, at 422 & n.85.
61. Some members of the press opposed any government regulation as
contrary to the very freedom they were trying to protect. See DIENEs ET AL.,
supra note 29, at 604 n.19. Others opposed being bound by a rigid statute or
wanted an absolute privilege. See Ervin, supranote 17, at 242-43.
62. In response to the escalating number of subpoenas, Attorney General
John Mitchell had issued federal guidelines for the Justice Department prior
to Branzburg, which required his personal authorization for all departmental
subpoenas served on the media. See John N. Mitchell, Free Press and Fair
Trial: The Subpoena Controversy, 59 ILL. B.J. 282, 292 (1970). The current
version appears at 28 C.F.R. § 50.10. Limitations imposed by the guidelines
required that members of the Justice Department make "all reasonable attempts" to obtain information first from nonmedia sources, that they ensure
the information sought was considered 'essential' to the investigation, and
that they narrowly tailor the scope of any subpoenas. See id.
63. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
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Meanwhile, several states, including Minnesota, responded to Branzburg by creating their own shield laws. Prior
to Branzburg, seventeen states had enacted specific statutes
designed to provide some degree of press privilege." Today, a
total of twenty-nine states plus the District of Columbia have
shield laws, offering varying levels of protection. 5 Most states
provide a qualified privilege, with disclosure compelled when
competing interests prevail."
3. Constitutional Protection
Following Branzburg, courts have looked to both state constitutions and the First Amendment as possible sources of reporter protection. 7 While the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to
revisit reporter privilege, nine out of the ten circuits that have
addressed the issue have interpreted Branzburg as recognizing
a qualified First Amendment privilege for journalists to resist
compelled disclosure.6 8 By 1977, the Tenth Circuit had de64. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691 n.27 (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania).
65. Inaddition to the states with statutes at the time of Branzburg, these
include Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Tennessee. Many states that have not enacted specific shield statutes have recognized either a common law or state constitutional privilege, so
that nearly all states provide some form of reporter's privilege. See DONALD
i. GILLMOR ET AL., MASS CoMUICATION LAW 344 (6th ed. 1998) (Connecticut,
Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia
and Wisconsin).
66. See DIENEs ET AL., supra note 29, at 683.
67. See Morse & Zucker, supra note 30, at 412 ("[Slome state courts
fashioned a privilege comparable to the First Amendmenfs by interpreting
state constitutional provisions or building on common law concepts to protect
journalists' information and materials.").
68. See Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1993); La Rouche v.
NBC, 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818; United
States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816;
Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("The Supreme Court
explicitly acknowledged the existence of First Amendment protection for news
gathering in Branzburg v. Hayes."); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc. 621
F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); United States
v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126
(1981); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 595-96
(1st Cir. 1980); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 714 (3d Cir. 1979) ("In
Branzburg v. Hayes, the Court acknowledged the existence of First Amendment protection for 'newsgathering."); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563
F.2d 433, 436-37 (10th Cir. 1977); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 467-68 (9th
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clared that "the present privilege is no longer in doubt."69 The
only circuit to decline to interpret Branzburg as recognizing
any First Amendment reporter privilege refused to protect a
reporter from compelled testimony before a grand jury 0 Nonetheless, the court approved a balancing of
interests between
71
freedom of the press and the duty to testify.
The scope of the privilege has varied widely within the circuits recognizing a limited privilege. Protection of confidential
sources has been most commonly recognized," but not always
upheld under the particular circumstances of the case.73 The
privilege has also been interpreted to limit forced disclosure of
nonconfidential, unpublished information, such as reporter
notes, tape outtakes and draft scripts. 74 For example, the Second Circuit refused to enforce a subpoena that sought production of both published and unpublished documents and tapes
in a criminal case where the defendant failed to meet the

Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976) ("It is clear that Branzburg recognizes some First Amendment protection of news sources."); Cervantes v.
Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 992-93 & n.9 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1125 (1973). The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have yet to decide the question.
69. Silkwood, 563 F.2d at 437.
70. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d at 585. "Justice Powells
opinion certainly does not warrant the rewriting of the majority opinion to
grant a first amendment testimonial privilege to news reporters." Id.
7L See id. at 584-86. The court distinguished between a constitutionally
required balancing test and one that met the balancing standard set by Branzburg. See id.
72. See Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 712 (noting the "preferred position of the First
Amendment" when protecting confidential sources in a civil case); Riley, 612
F.2d at 715 ("[J]ournalists have a federal common law privilege, albeit qualified, to refuse to divulge their sources."); Silkwood, 563 F.2d at 437
("[Branzburg] recogniz[es] a privilege which protects information given in
confidence to a reporter."); Baker v. F&F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973) ("Compelled disclosure of confidential
sources unquestionably threatens a journalist's ability to secure information.").
73. See Miller, 621 F.2d at 725 (finding the privilege must yield in a libel
suit where the press is a party); Farr,522 F.2d at 469 (finding due process
guarantee to a fair trial in a criminal case outweighs reporter privilege).
74. See Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[W]e hold that
the journalist's privilege applies to a journalist's resource materials even in
the absence of confidentiality."); United States v. La Rouche, 841 F.2d 1176,
1182 (1st Cir. 1988) (finding routine, compelled disclosure of unpublished,
nonconfidential information to be a "lurking and subtle threat," but finding
defendant's interests in case to outweigh First Amendment issues after applying balancing test); von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1987);
United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1981).
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threshold balancing test. 5 The court required a "clear and
specific showing" that the information is "highly material and
relevant, necessary or critical to the... claim, and not obtainable from other available sources." 76
The standard articulated by the Second Circuit is similar
to factors considered by most other federal courts in defining
the boundaries of the qualified privilege." Courts may vary
the required degree of relevancy,78 the standard used for exhausting alternative sources, 0 or how critical the information
must be to the central issues of the case," but nonetheless
consistently apply some version of a balancing test to weigh the
competing interests.
4. Reporter Privilege in Minnesota Before State v. Turner
In response to the Branzburg decision, Minnesota passed
the Free Flow of Information Act."' Early treatment by the district courts provided fairly broad protection to reporters, applying a balancing test for both confidential and nonconfidential
materials and ordering disclosure only if there was a showing
the party had met the threshold requirements.82 As recently as
75. See Burke, 700 F.2d at 78.
76. Id. at 77. The court applied this standard of protection both for confidential information and unpublished reporter work product.
77. The elements appeared in both the Garland opinion, see supra note
32, and in Justice Stewarfs dissent in Branzburg, see 408 U.S. at 743.
78. See Shoen v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 412, 416 (9th Cir. 1995) (compelled disclosure of nonconfidential information must be "clearly relevant to an important issue in the case" with a showing of actual, not potential relevance); In re
Petroleum Products, 680 F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[D]isclosure may be ordered
only upon a clear and specific showing that the information is: highly material
and relevant.").
79. See Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 713-14 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that
efforts to find alternative sources must be "very substantial"); United States
v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding defendant met burden of establishing that information not available from another, unprivileged
source).
80. See Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 550 (2d Cir. 1958 (noting the information sought "went to the heart of the plaintiffs claim"); In re Application
(Krase v. Graco) 79 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that the information
must be so critical to maintenance of the case that the case "virtually rises or
falls with the admission or exclusion of the proffered evidence?" (quoting
United States v. Marcos, No. 87 CR 598, 1990 WL 74521, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June
1, 1990))).
81. Minnesota Free Flow of Information Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 595.021595.025 (1996). See infra note 167 for the text of the key provisions.
82. See McNeilus v. Corporate Report, No. CO-91-120 1993 WL 542394
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 16, 1993) (unpublished order); United States v. Ford,
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1994, the district court in State v. Ross 3 interpreted the Minnesota Shield Law to protect reporters from compelled production of all notes, recordings and files in a criminal case where
the defendant had failed to make the requisite showing to
overcome the privilege. In reaching this holding, the court
recognized the press's concerns about burdensomeness and
about being perceived as an arm of the state in a criminal investigation.8 5
There was a sudden shift in interpretation of the Shield
Law in 1994, when in Heaslip v. Freeman,86 the Minnesota
Court of Appeals limited reporter privilege to protection of
confidential sources and information.87 Heaslip read section
595.02318 as providing protection from disclosing unpublished
information "which would tend to identify the person or means
through which the information was obtained."89 This reading
conflicted with an earlier Court of Appeals decision 9 and most
of the district court cases that interpreted the statute to protect
Crim. No. 4-92-112 (D. Mini. 1992) (unpublished order); State v. Guevara, No.
K7-92-1032 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 24, 1992) (unpublished order); Jackson v.
State, No. 796844 (Minn. Dist. Ct. April 4, 1983) (unpublished order); Aerial
Burials v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune, 8 Media L. Rep. 1653 (BNA) (Minm.
Dist. Ct. 1982) (finding that the Shield Law protected both confidential and
non-confidential materials, published and unpublished information); see also
State v. Astleford, 323 N.W.2d 733 (Minn. 1982) (finding insufficient showing
of relevance and materiality in pretrial certified question in a criminal case to
compel testimony of television reporter); State v. Brenner, 488 N.W. 2d 339
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992). But cf. In re The Investigation of the Assualt, Arson
Riot and Other Crimes on 5/7/92 in North Minneapolis (Minm. Dist. Ct. June
23, 1992) (unpublished order) (finding no reporter privilege under Shield Law
for nonbroadcast videotape of crime scene absent confidential sources and
given overriding interest in criminal prosecution of case). During the first
twenty years of the Shield Law, reporters relied on broad district court precedent to prevent enforcement of subpoenas. See Interviews, supra note 11. A
literal interpretation of § 595.024 would create an absolute privilege in misdemeanor and civil cases, but courts have nonetheless applied a balancing
test. See, e.g., Aerial Burials, 8 Media L. Rep. at 1653. Whether similar applications are likely to continue is beyond the scope of this paper.
83. No. KO-94-70, 1994 WL 750593 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 11, 1994).
84 See id. at *2
85. See id. at *1-2.
86. 511 N.W.2d 21, 24 (Minm. Ct. App. 1994), pet. for review denied, (Feb.
24, 1994 Minm. 1994).
87. See id. at 21.
88. See infra note 167 (quoting the provision).
89. Heaslip, 511 N.W.2d at 23.
90. See State v. Brenner, 488 N.W. 2d 339, 341 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)
(applying balancing test in criminal case requesting unpublished reporter
notes and finding in camera review appropriate response to criminal defendanfs Sixth Amendment interests).
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both confidential and nonconfidential materials.9" While the
Heaslip court implied it might have reached a different decision
had a constitutional privilege been asserted,92 no such defense
had been raised by the parties. 3
II. STATE V. TURNER
The Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the issue of reporter privilege for the first time since the Supreme Court's
Branzburg decision in State v. Turner.94 The case also marked
the first application by the court of the state's Shield Law to
nonconfidential information. The court found that there was
no qualified constitutional privilege for reporters, and that the
protection provided by Minnesota's Shield Law was limited to
confidential sources and information.95
Turner first addressed the issue of compelled reporter testimony. The court interpreted Branzburg as holding that no
qualified reporter privilege existed,96 and that reporters are required to testify before a grand jury like other citizens. 97 In
doing so, the court relied on a noted commentator's assessment
that no reporter privilege existed at common law9 and Justice
White's Branzburg opinion.Y The Turner court noted that
other courts had interpreted Branzburg differently, finding a

91. The relevant text of § 595.023 was interpreted as preventing disclosure of unpublished information and "notes, memoranda, recording tapes,
[and] film or other reportorial data which would tend to identify the person or
means through which the information was obtained." MINN. STAT. § 595.023
(emphasis added). See infra note 167 for the full text of the provision.
92. See Heaslip, 511 N.W.2d at 24.
93. See id. Two subsequent appellate decisions also applied a narrow interpretation of the Shield Law. See infra note 112.
94. 550 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1996).
95. See id. at 630-31.
96. See id. at 627 ("The Court ... refused to establish a qualified reporter's privilege.").
97. See id. The Turner court read Branzburg as rejecting the argument
that compelled testimony might interfere with the free flow of information because there was no evidence this would happen. See id. Most relevant to the
court was the reasoning that the public interest in criminal prosecutions outweighed any possible interest in the chilling effect on future confidential informants. See id.
98. See id. (citing 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 24, § 5426, at 716
n.22).
99. See id.
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reporter privilege under different circumstances, but the court
considered these interpretations to be "strained."' °°
Applying Branzburgto the facts in Turner, the court found
no constitutional privilege that protected the newspaper photographer from being compelled to testify at the omnibus
hearing. 1 ' Since it is unclear what the photographer had seen
and heard during the arrest, the court reasoned he could be
compelled to testify as an eyewitness to a crime.2 Noting that
a reporter cannot escape his obligation to testify simply because he observed a crime while acting in his professional capacity,"3 the court asserted that its opinion was in line with the
majority of courts since Branzburg, which have found no constitutional protection for reporters who have been an eyewitness to a crime.1°4
The Turner court did not directly analyze a constitutional
privilege regarding unpublished, nonconfidential information,
like the unpublished photographs in this case, but referred approvingly to an appellate court decision 5 that declined to apply a qualified privilege for unpublished, nonconfidential photographs.101 Turner also followed the result of the appellate
court in its order for in camera review of the unpublished information, 7 proposing that this review would mitigate any
"concerns of overburdening the news media."' As authority,
the court cited a U.S. Supreme Court case involving a defendant
accused of rape who sought access to a state agency's confidential file.'o The U.S. Supreme Court ordered in camera review
after the defendant had made a sufficient showing of materiality and significance to the outcome of the case. 110
100. Id.
101 See id. at 628.
102. See Turner,550 N.W.2d at 628.
103. See id. (citing State v. Knutson (Knutson 1), 523 N.W.2d 909, 913
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994), pet. for review denied, (Minn. Jan. 13, 1995)).
104- See id. The court also found no broader protection for reporters under
the state constitution. See id.
105. See State v. Knutson (Knutson I), 539 N.W. 2d 254, 257 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1996).
106. See Turner,550 N.W.2d at 628.
107. See id. at 629 (citing Knutson II, 539 N.W.2d at 258).
108. Id.
109. See id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58 n.15 (1987)).
110. See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58. The Turner court, 550 N.W.2d at 629,
cited additional cases involving access to confidential government or medical
records: State v. Hummel, 483 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 1992) (finding defendant's request for in camera review of mental health records was properly

1580

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:1563

Finally, the Turner court limited application of the Shield
Law to the protection of reporter's confidential sources and information. While the statute had previously been interpreted by
lower state courts to include protection from compelled disclosure of nonconfidential and unpublished information,' Turner
adopted the recent Heaslip court's interpretation, finding that
the broader application was not supported by the text, history,
or purpose of the Act."' The court noted that the Minnesota
Shield Law was passed in order to provide additional protection to reporters against subpoenas, but asserted that similar
laws in other states had not been applied to nonconfidential
and unpublished information, nor to eyewitness testimony in
most cases.' 3 Finally, once again agreeing with Heaslip and
Knutson, the Turner court declared that the Shield Law had
"clearly" been aimed at protecting confidential relationships
4
and so did not implicate the subpoenas in the Turner case."
The Shield Law, the court concluded, provided no special protection for either the photographer's testimony or the unpublished
photographs since neither involved confidential material. 5
IH. IMPLICATIONS OF THE LOSS OF REPORTER
PRIVILEGE AND REBUILDING THE SHIELD
State v. Turner undermines important constitutional protections for the press in Minnesota, protections that are widely
denied by district court due to defendanfs failure to show how records could
be relevant to his defense); State v. Paradee, 403 N.W.2d 640, 642 (Minn.
1987) (ordering in camera review of welfare department records); State v.
Kutchara, 350 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Minn. 1984) (finding privilege not to disclose
past medical records must sometimes give way to defendantfs right to confront
his accusers, but in camera review by court did not reveal any relevant information). The court did not, however, cite cases covering reporter privilege.
11t See supra Part I.C.4 (discussing early court interpretation of the Minnesota Shield Law).
112. See Turner, 550 N.W.2d at 630; see also Heaslip v. Freeman, 511
N.W.2d 21, 23 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). Two subsequent appellate opinions
applied a similar interpretation. See Knutson I, 523 N.W.2d 909, 912 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1994) (finding Minnesota Shield Law does not apply to compelled
eyewitness testimony of Minnesota Daily reporter if confidential source not
identified); Knutson II, 539 N.W.2d 254, 257 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (finding
that Shield Law did not protect unpublished photographs if no confidential
source disclosed). Heaslip was decided solely under the state Shield Law,
while Knutson I and II also considered First Amendment privileges.
113. - See Turner, 550 N.W.2d at 631 (citing 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra
note 24, at 775).
114. See id.
115. See id.
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recognized by federal courts around the country, including
those in Minnesota." 6 The decision also restricts protection
under Minnesota's Shield Law, leaving the media susceptible
to broad and routine subpoenas that threaten to interfere with
their newsgathering activities. The solution suggested by
Turner of in camera inspection of unpublished, nonconfidential
information provides an inadequate remedy. To encourage a
free and vigorous press in the state, the Minnesota legislature
should amend the Shield Law to ensure broader protection for
the media, while protecting defendants' interests in access to
the best evidence.

A. FiRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
1. The Turner Court Misinterpreted U.S. Supreme Court
Precedent Regarding a Qualified Reporter Privilege
In the overwhelming majority of federal circuits, journalists are afforded special protection under the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press.11 7 Only one circuit
has interpreted Branzburg as precluding a constitutional reporter privilege, and that opinion involved a grand jury proceeding, as did Branzburg."I The Turner court also declined to
interpret Branzburg as suggesting a qualified privilege, characterizing other courts' reliance on Justice Powell's concurrence as "strained interpretations." 1 9
Such a dismissive approach to the other appellate decisions is unwarranted. Certainly, the U.S. Supreme Court has
held that reporters cannot refuse to testify before a grand jury
by relying on reporter privilege, 20 but both Justice White's plurality opinion and Justice Powell's concurrence provide support
for the interpretation that a qualified reporter privilege exists
in other circumstances.' Writing for the Court, Justice White
suggested that a qualified privilege may be invoked as "news
gathering is not without its First Amendment protections,""
and that "without some protection for seeking out the news,
116. See supra note 68; see also J.J.C. v. Fridell, 165 F.R.D. 513, 513 (D.
Minn. 1995).
117. See supra note 68.
118. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1987).
119. Turner, 550 N.W.2d at 627.
120. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 708.
12L See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
122. Branzburg,408 U.S. at 707.
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freedom of the press could be eviscerated. " 12l The Court also
made clear it was not endorsing an indiscriminate disclosure of
sources merely upon request, 124 indicating the existence of a
threshold requirement.
Justice Powell's critical concurrence stressed the limited
nature of the Court's opinion, specifically rejecting compelled
testimony having "only a remote and tenuous relationship" to
the investigation. 125 He also suggested a threshold need requirement, offering the court's protection if disclosure did not
serve a legitimate law enforcement need. 126 Most compelling,
however, was his assertion of the need for a balancing test on a
case-by-case basis to weigh competing constitutional interests. 27
This reading of Branzburg has support in the Attorney
General Guidelines, which set forth procedures for federal law
enforcement to issue subpoenas for the media.2 8 The Guidelines' statement of purpose recognizes the threat that compelled disclosure can inhibit a free press, and the regulations
establish threshold requirements that must be met. 29 While
limited in applicability to the Justice Department, the Guidelines are a strong indication of First Amendment protections
afforded the press for newsgathering.
The Turner court's dismissal of a reporter privilege misreads, therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Branzburg
and the protections it provides the press, as demonstrated by
interpretations of the federal courts over the past twenty-five
years.

123. Id. at 681.
124. See id. at 682; see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 563 F.2d 433, 437
(10th Cir. 1977).
125. See id. at 710.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See supra note 62 (discussing the Guidelines)
129. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10.
[F]reedom of the press can be no broader than the freedom of reporters to investigate and report the news, [so that] the prosecutorial
power of the government should not be used in such a way that it impairs a reporter's responsibility to cover as broadly as possible controversial public issues. This policy statement is thus intended to
provide protection for the news media from forms of compulsory
process, whether civil or criminal, which might impair the news
gathering function.
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2. The Turner Court Improperly Ignored the Negative Impact
on Newsgathering When No Qualified Privilege Exists
Turner erred in failing to distinguish between subpoenas
served on reporters in their capacity as citizens and as members of the press. 3 Reporter privilege is not a personal one
provided to the journalist; it extends to the reporter from the
job of gathering information for the public.'3 ' The issue is
whether there is a burden on newsgathering activities when
broad disclosure requests are only limited when confidential
information is involved. A qualified reporter privilege is
needed to protect newsgathering, not to confer journalists with
a special status of immunity.'
Courts recognizing a qualified reporter privilege have
utilized a balancing test to weigh the burden on newsgathering
against the evidentiary interest in disclosure on a case-by-case
basis, requiring as a minimum that the requested information
be highly relevant, critical to the maintenance of the claim, and
not available from other sources.'33 The Turner court erred by
declining to apply such a balancing test to the unpublished
photographs and rejecting the need to make any preliminary
showing of relevance to compel a reporter's testimony.'34
In contrast, other courts have recognized the special dangers presented by routine disclosures of nonconfidential infor130. See Turner, 550 N.W.2d at 629 ("The inconvenience suffered by reporters and news photographers... is no more compelling than the inconvenience suffered by any other citizen who must disrupt his or her daily activities
131

See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 85 (1975)

("These rights, while lodged in the reporter and his publisher, in reality reflect an underlying interest of the public. ... 'The issue is the public's right to
know. That right is the reporter's by virtue of the proxy which the freedom of
the press clause in the First Amendment gives to the press in behalf of the
public.' (citation omitted)).
132. The overwhelming majority of subpoenas of media organizations today occur where the media is a third party. The media was a party in only
3.7% of all subpoenas reported in a 1993 survey. See THE REPORTERS COMM.
FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, AGENTS OF DISCOVERY: A REPORT ON THE
INCIDENCE OF SUBPOENAS SERVED ON THE NEws MEDIA IN 1993, at 4-5 (1995).

Journalists are more frequent targets of subpoenas due to the nature of their
job. They regularly gather information involving crime, accidents, disasters
and malfeasance, which makes them knowledgeable about events that result
in litigation. Furthermore, since reporters routinely disclose the fact they
have this information, they are more vulnerable to disclosure requests from a
wide variety of self-interested parties
133. See supra Part I.C.3 (discussing the balancing test).
134. See Turner, 550 N.W.2d at 628.
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mation. As the First Circuit commented, "We discern a lurking
and subtle threat to journalists and their employers if disclosure of outtakes, notes, and other unused information, even if
nonconfidential, becomes routine and casually, if not cavalierly, compelled." '35 Failure to require a balancing test encourages routine and widespread use of subpoenas by litigants
seeking easy access to information, pictures, and reports gathered by journalists in the course of their work. Readily available subpoenas in turn impose restraints on newsgathering. If
courts do not apply a balancing test or rigorously review subpoena requests, the practice of "subjecting the press to discovery
as a nonparty will be widespread."'36 Enlarging the use and
scope of subpoenas has several negative impacts on newsgathering.
a. Loss of PerceivedNeutrality: When courts and prosecutors have unlimited access to reporter notes containing background information, or documents and private papers acquired
in an investigation, the public begins to see the media as
merely a conduit or tool of government instead of a neutral
party. This undermines public support of a neutral press and
restricts access to information. Of particular concern is the
negative impact on a journalists' ability to develop trust relationships with groups that are disaffected and distrustful of
the government, stories that are especially difficult to cover in
the mainstream press. 3 7 As the Ninth Circuit has noted, it is
135. United States v. LaRouche, 841 F.2d 1176, 1182 (1st Cir. 1988); see
also Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir. 1993); O'Neill v. Oakgrove
Construction, Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 521, 526 (N.Y. 1988) ("The autonomy of the
press would be jeopardized if resort to its resource materials, by litigants
seeking to utilize the newsgathering efforts of journalists for their private
purposes, were routinely permitted.").
136. O'Neill, 71 N.Y.2d at 526.
137. Earl Caldwell, the New York Times reporter who covered the activities of the Black Panthers in the sixties, and who was one of the reporters ordered to testify before a grand jury in the Branzburg decision, had spent
months gaining the confidence of the members of that organization. This
trust allowed him access to information that enabled him to report with a
unique level of depth and understanding. Caldwell was called before a grand
jury so that government investigators could question him on all unpublished
information he had acquired during the course of his work as a reporter. See
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 747-50 & nn.38-41 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). In an affidavit filed with the District Court, Caldwell stated:
I began covering and writing articles about the Black Panthers almost from the time of their inception, and I myself found that in
those first months... they were very brief and reluctant to discuss
any substantive matter with me. However, as they realized I could
be trusted and my sole purpose was to collect my information and
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their neutral status that often allows the media access to
meetings, even without a pledge of confidentiality, where government officials would not be allowed. 3 ' If the press is seen
as a routine investigative arm of the courts, future stories will
to trust reporters
be compromised when sources are reticent
39
with sensitive information and leads.
b. Intrusion in EditorialProcess: The use of broadly inclusive subpoenas also has a chilling effect on the press itself.
Turning over unpublished notes, outlines, draft scripts, and
outtakes subjects the press to a review of its editorial decisions
by the courts and other public officials."4 The prospect of governmental review of editorial decisions may well inhibit newsgathering and writing activities and "substantially undercut
the public policy favoring the free flow of information to the
public that is the foundation for the privilege." M Governmental interference with the press was one of the abuses feared by
those who drafted the First Amendment," and there is concern
that routine government access to unpublished information
will interfere
with the role of the media as the watchdog of
143
government.
c. Burden on Time and Resources: The growth in quantity
and breadth of subpoenas also puts an increasing strain on the
time and resources of reporters and editors, and thus interferes
present it objectively in the newspaper and that I had no other motive, I found that not only were the party leaders available for indepth interviews but also the rank and file members were cooperative in aiding me in the newspaper stories that I wanted to do. During the time that I have been covering the party, I have noticed other
newspapermen representing legitimate organizations in the news
media being turned away because they were not known and trusted
by the party leadership.
Id. at 749 n.41.
138. See Shoen, 5 F.3d at 1295 (citing Morse & Zucker, supra note 30, at
474).

139. See id.

140. See United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980)

("Mhe compelled production of a reporter's [unpublished and nonconfidential]

resource materials can constitute a significant intrusion into the newsgathering and editorial processes ... ."); see also J.J.C. v. Fridell, 165 F.R.D. 513,
515 (D. Minn. 1995) ("Federal courts are motivated to cultivate a reporter's
privilege to prevent judicial intrusion into the editorial process, and to ensure
the free flow of information to the public.").
141. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d at 147.
142. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) ('The press was
protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people.").
143. See supra note 20; see also Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d at 147.
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with their ability to investigate and report stories. Time spent
retrieving materials for subpoenas and time spent in court detracts from time spent on reporting. This is a particularly
critical issue for smaller media organizations that may only
have one or two reporters. While reporters should face these
burdens when defending the stories they publish, the increase
in third party litigation and the need to produce and explain
material that has not been published increases the burden
substantially.
The increased burden encourages changes in industry
practices that interfere with the quality of reportorial information provided to the public. Reporters may have a disincentive
to compile and retain information. As with attorney work
product,"M fear of public disclosure of notes compiled while preparing a report may discourage journalists from producing
written material altogether, which is likely to adversely affect
the accuracy of their reporting. These fears also lead to procedures for routine destruction of materials, hampering future
reporting and eliminating information that might be essential
to future court proceedings.'45 Even more alarmingly, journalists actually have an incentive to prepare reports that rely on
confidential sources and information since the courts afford
these materials greater protection, even though this practice
runs counter to the best journalistic standards of minimizing
the use of confidential sources.'46
Furthermore, the burden on time and resources makes it less
likely that journalists will attempt risky and lengthy investigations, particularly when costly litigation to protect information is probable. Media organizations, already under increased
pressures to maintain profitable margins, are less likely to risk
the investment of time and expense to investigate "difficult"
144. Cf. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
145. See United States v. LaRouche, 841 F.2d 1176, 1182 (1st Cir. 1988)
("To the extent that compelled disclosure becomes commonplace, it seems
likely indeed that internal policies of destruction of materials may be devised
and choices as to subject matter made, which could be keyed to avoiding disclosure requests or compliance therewith rather than to the basic function of
providing news and comment.").
146. The use of both confidential and anonymous sources is widely regarded by the mainstream press as substantially less desirable than sources
willing to publicly acknowledge their statements. They are considered generally less reliable, and provide the news consumer with less information to
evaluate the validity of the sources' statements. See JAY BLACK ET AL., DOING
ETHICS IN JOURNALISM 185 (The Sigma Delta Chi Found. & The Soc'y of Profl
Journalists 1993).
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stories, despite the potential public interest. As a result, the
public will receive more stories directly from government officials with less investigative filtering by reporters, and more
noncontroversial reports on such topics as entertainment and
consumer issues.
3. The Turner Court's Failure to Find a Qualified Privilege
Creates an Erroneous Hierarchy of Constitutional Rights
in Criminal Cases
In Branzburg, Justice Powell pointed to the need for balancing the rights of a criminal defendant with the rights of a
free press.'4 7 Turner declined to apply any balancing test regarding reporter testimony, asserting only that a reporter is
not excused from testifying as an eyewitness, presumably to
By failing to
protect the rights of the criminal defendant.'
the court
however,
concerns,
constitutional
weigh competing
those
over
Amendment
Sixth
the
under
elevated rights existing
of the First Amendment.
As the Third Circuit noted in United States. v. Cuthbertson," the framers of the constitution did not contemplate a
constitutional system where one right was inherently preferred
over another. The Cuthbertsoncourt noted,
"The authors of the Bill of Rights did not undertake to assign priorities as between First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights,
ranking one as superior to the other.... (iif the authors of these
guarantees, fully aware of the potential conflicts between them, were
unwilling or unable to resolve the issue by assigning to one priority
the Constitution by underover the other, it is not for us to 5rewrite
0
taking what they declined to do."1

The application of a balancing test permits the court to
weigh the criminal defendant's interests against the impact on
the media. 5' When no balancing test is applied, the criminal
147. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972); see also Baker v.
F&F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 784 (2d Cir. 1972).
148. See Turner,550 N.W.2d at 628.
149. United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d. 139 (3d Cir. 1980).
150. Id. at 147 (quoting Nebraska Press Ass'n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561
(1976)).
15L See United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1983) ("We see no
legally-principled reason for drawing a distinction between civil and criminal
cases when considering whether the reporter's interest in confidentiality
should yield to the moving party's need for probative evidence. To be sure, a
criminal defendant has more at stake than a civil litigant and the evidentiary
needs of a criminal defendant may weigh more heavily in the balance.");
Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d at 147 ("[T]he interests of the press that form the foun-

1588

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:1563

defendant's Sixth Amendment interests are given inherent
preference over the press's First Amendment protections. This
inherent preference constitutes an impermissible rewriting of
the Constitution.
The Turner court's failure to apply a balancing test erroneously placed all criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights over the public's interest in First Amendment rights of a
free press regardless of the relevancy, materiality, or significance of the information to the essential elements of a particular case. This denigration of the First Amendment concerns
about impediments to newsgathering could be avoided by applying the balancing test adopted by the majority of federal
courts to recognize a reporter's qualified privilege.
4. The Turner Court's Remedy of In Camera Review of
Unpublished, Nonconfidential Documents Provides
Insufficient Protection
After finding no constitutional reporter privilege for eyewitness testimony, the Turner court limited its analysis of unpublished material by noting that some protection is needed
and ordered in camera inspection as a remedy.'52 Requiring in
camera review of unpublished, nonconfidential information before any threshold has been met is an inadequate remedy for
protecting the press and is seemingly without authority. The
court's decision erroneously deferred any possible application
of a balancing test until after all the requested materials have
been assembled and turned over to the courts. In the event
that in camera review is required, it should only be ordered after
the requesting party has shown the requisite relevance, need
and effort to obtain the information from alternative sources.
Turner adopted the Knutson IV"53 court's remedy of in camera review as an appropriate means of balancing the need for
disclosure and the needs of a free press.14 The cases cited by
dation for the privilege .... [do] not change because a case is civil or criminal.... [Riather than affecting the existence of the qualified privilege, we
think that these rights are important factors that must be considered.").
152. See hrner, 550 N.W.2d at 629 ("We recognize... that some courts
have required a threshold showing of relevance, need and unavailability before a reporter will be forced to disclose nontestimonial, unpublished information. ... [I]n camera review by the district court is an appropriate means
of balancing the defendant's need for evidence ... against the public's interest
in a free and independent press.").
153. 539 N.W.2d 254 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
154. See Turner,550 N.W.2d at 629.
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Knutson II, however, do not support in camera review as a substitute for meeting a threshold requirement. Two out of the
three opinions relied on in Knutson 11 did not, in fact, order in
camera review.'55 They referred to this practice as a possibility,
'
The
but only after a threshold requirement had been met. 56
third court did order a partial in camera review, but only after
applying a rigorous balancing test, with the added provision
that the material not be released, even if found relevant, until
after witnesses had testified in court and the material' was
found necessary for possible impeachment.'57 Neither Turner
nor Knutson 11 imposed similar constraints.
The Turner court also relied on Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,'58
a U.S. Supreme Court case, and several Minnesota cases'59 as
authority for in camera review. None of the cases cited, however, involved reporter privilege. Instead,, the requests involved confidential medical and psychiatric records of victims'606
and governmental investigative and social service records. '
First Amendment cases require a different analysis than cases
involving victim privacy. Privacy and confidentiality may be
elements of a claim for reporter privilege, but constitutional
considerations of the negative impact on newsgathering are
also implicated with media subpoenas. Moreover, even the
Ritchie decision pointedly required a threshold showing of materiality and need before ordering in camera review of confidential government records.'62

155. See Burke, 700 F.2d at 78; Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper
Corp., 633 F.2d 583, 599 (1st Cir. 1980).
156. See Burke, 700 F.2d at 78 n.9 (finding the trial court did not commit
error by refusing to order in camera review, but noting it did not preclude
such a procedure if the information were sufficiently relevant and central to
the case); Bruno, 633 F.2d at 597-98 (noting the court has several options in
determining whether or not to compel disclosure, depending on its assessment
of the risk to newsgathering and need in the case).
157. See United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d. 139, 148 (3d Cir. 1980).
158. 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
159. See State v. Hummel, 483 N.W.2d 68 (Minn. 1992); State v. Paradee,
403 N.W.2d 640 (Minn. 1987); State v. Kutchara, 350 N.W.2d 924 (Minn.
1984); see also supra note 110.
160. See Hummel, 483 N.W.2d at 71; Kutchara,350 N.W.2d at 926.
161. See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 42-43; Paradee,403 N.W.2d at 640.
162. See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58 n.15 ("He must at least make some plausible showing of how their testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense.' (quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S.
858, 867 (1982))).
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Ordering in camera review before any threshold showing is
also contrary to the policy considerations behind the First
Amendment's protection of the press. It applies the balancing
test at the wrong time and is not a substitute for the obligation
of the moving party to first show relevance, need, and effort to
find alternative sources.'63 Because no threshold showing is
required, the court will automatically review all documents
subject to the subpoena. As the facts in Turner show, a defendant can subpoena both personnel and documents from a media organization despite no showing of relevance, let alone
compelling need or alternative sources. Review by the court of
both confidential information and unpublished reporter work
product is review by an arm of the government. This has a
negative impact on the perceived neutrality of the press, and
has a chilling effect on both sources and journalists who fear
government intrusion in the editorial process. In contrast, requiring a threshold test before an order for in camera review
avoids many of the undue negative impacts on the press discussed above.'1
Requiring in camera review before applying a balancing
test creates an additional problem for the courts. First, they
are given little guidance in determining what to disclose when
the moving party has not provided specific reasons why it considers the material relevant and necessary to their claim.'65
Furthermore, since in camera review is an ex parte proceeding,
the press is afforded no opportunity to demonstrate how particular disclosure decisions may impose burdens on newsgathering activities. As a result, the court has limited information
to assist it in applying a balancing test during in camera review. The Turner court's holding that unpublished information
must be submitted to the court for in camera review before any

163. See New York Times v. Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1331, 1335 (1978)
(Marshall, J., in chambers) ("Given the likelihood that forced disclosure even
for in camera review will inhibit the reporter's and newspaper's exercise of
First Amendment rights... some threshold showing of materiality, relevance,
and necessity should be required.").
164. See supra Part HIA.2.
165. See Brief for Respondent at 5, State v. Turner, 550 N.W.2d 622 (Minn.
1996) (No.C5-95-2668) (quoting Judge Donald Gross at the pretrial hearing on
November 17, 1995: "It is not clear to me how the testimony of the reporter/photographer would be relevant or fit into a probable cause hearing
with respect to photographs. It is not clear to me how these would be relevant. And if I have to conduct an in camera inspection, you are not giving me
any indication of what I should be looking for.").
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threshold requirement is met, therefore, is without legal support and is unwise as a matter of public policy.

B. THE MINNESOTA SHIELD LAW
The Turner court relied on the Minnesota Court of Appeals
decision in Heaslip v. Freeman" to apply a narrow textual interpretation to the Minnesota Free Flow of Information Act.'67
Turner and Heaslip's conclusion that the Act is limited to the
protection of confidential sources and information reverses an
earlier Court of Appeals reading of the statute,'6 8 as well as a
line of district court cases that found the statute covered nonconfidential information and sources. 69' These previous cases
established a level of expectation on the part of the media, defense attorneys, and the government that permitted disclosure
under particular circumstances, but required a certain threshold showing before disclosure was compelled. The Turner court
erred in departing from this long-standing line of analysis.
As a matter of textual analysis, the Heaslip opinion relied
predominantly on what it admitted was a "finely tuned"7
grammatical reading of section 595.023. Heaslip focused on
166. 511 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
167. See Turner, 550 N.W.2d at 630 (construing MINN. STAT. §§ 595.021595.025 (1996)). Two provisions are key for this discussion:
§595.022. Public Policy. In order to protect the public interest
and the free flow of information, the news media should have the
benefit of a substantial privilege not to reveal sources of information
or to disclose unpublished information. To this end, the freedom of
press requires protection of the confidential relationship between the
news gatherer and the source of information. The purpose of sections
595.021 to 595.025 is to insure and perpetuate, consistent with the
public interest, the confidential relationship between the news media
and its sources.
§595.023. Disclosure prohibited. No person who is or has been
directly engaged in the gathering, procuring, compiling, editing, or
publishing of information for the purpose of transmission, dissemination or publication to the public shall be required by any court,
grand jury, agency, department or branch of the state, or any of its
political subdivisions or other public body, or by either house of the
legislature or any committee, officer, member, or employee thereof, to
disclose in any proceeding the person or means from or through
which information was obtained, or to disclose any unpublished information procured by the person in the course of work or any of the
person's notes, memoranda, recording tapes, film or other reportorial
data which would tend to identify the person or means through which
the information was obtained.
168. See State v. Brenner, 488 N.W.2d 339, 341 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
169. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
170. Heaslip v. Freeman, 511 N.W.2d 21,23 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
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the absence of a comma, parallel infinitive construction, and
what it found to be the overall focus of the Act, to conclude that
the statute protects only confidential sources and information.
This reading, however, ignores the clearly worded purpose
clause, which states that the broad, overall goal of the statute
is "to protect the public interest and the free flow of information." 7 ' Section 595.022 specifically states that "the news media should have the benefit of a substantial privilege not to reveal sources of information or to disclose unpublished
information."72 The separate treatment of these elements of
newsgathering, in light of the broad purpose of the statute,
helps clarify the ambiguous meaning of section 595.023. A
narrow reading of section 595.023 is structurally inconsistent
with section 595.022, thus violating the "whole act rule. " " If
the legislature had intended to limit the statute to protection of
confidential sources, the term "unpublished information" in the
purpose clause would be meaningless, contrary to the presumption that every word or phrase has significance. 74 In addition, a narrow reading makes the inclusion of "unpublished
information" in section 595.023 redundant, since the clause
which follows, listing notes, memoranda and reportorial data,
covers whatever might be considered as "unpublished information." Considering the statute as a whole, a textual analysis
supports a broad reading to protect the public's interest in the
free flow of information.
The Turner court's conclusion that the Free Flow of Information Act was passed by the legislature with the limited purpose of protecting confidential sources'75 fails to take account of
other indications that the legislature contemplated a broader
purpose. Contemporaneous newspaper coverage of the bill indicated an intent to protect both confidential sources and un-

171. § 595.022.
172. Id. (emphasis added).
173. "When 'interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause in which general words may be used, but will take in connection
with it the whole statute... and the objects and policy of the law, as indicated
by its various provisions, and give to it such a construction as will carry into
execution the will of the Legislature.'" Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650
(1974) (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 194 (1857)); see
also MINN.STAT. § 645.16 ("Every law shall be construed, if possible, to give
effect to all its provisions.").
174. See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 369 n.14 (1986) (refusing to
interpret a statute in a manner that renders a phrase superfluous).
175. See Turner, 550 N.W.2d at 631.
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published information. 6 John Finnegan, former executive editor of the St. Paul Pioneer Press, and one of the chief proponents of the Minnesota Shield Law, spoke publicly and forcefully against the government's demands for reporters'
unpublished information in addition to compelled disclosure of
confidential sources."
Another media professional who actively campaigned for the passage of the Shield Law, recalls
specifically aiming the statute to cover both confidential and
nonconfidential information.'78 These signs argue against the
hasty conclusion of a limited legislative purpose.
The likelihood that the movement in Minnesota was motivated by a broader intent to protect newsgathering in general
is supported by similar discussions at the time around the
country. Across the nation, the overarching consideration was
to protect the newsgathering process, with particular consideration given to the compelled disclosure of confidential
sources as one aspect of that process.'79 In Branzburg,Justice
White wrote about freedom of the press in terms of "news gathering," 80 while Justice Powell separately noted the need for
protection both of confidentiality and other newsgathering
practices. 8 ' Furthermore, one of the earliest circuit court decisions following Branzburg, found a broad constitutional
privilege, which included unpublished information whether or
not it was confidential. 2 This court found that compelled dis-

176. See MINNEPOLIS STAR, Feb. 28, 1973, at 5A ("[The proposed bill]
would prohibit state courts or governmental agencies from requiring reporters
to disclose confidential sources or unpublished information unless... four
conditions are met." (emphasis added)).
177. See ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS & DISPATCH, Sept. 22, 1992, at 5
(describing various proposed state shield laws and testimony regarding proposed federal statute). Finnegan was a vocal leader both nationally, as the
chair of the Freedom of Information Committee of the Associated Press Managing Editors Association, and locally in the efforts by the Joint Media Committee to pass the Minnesota Shield Law.
178. "We thought we had it right," ruefully recalls Don Gillmor, Silha Professor of Media Ethics and Law, University of Minnesota, reacting to the Heaslip/Turner interpretation of the statute. Interview with Don Gillmor in
Minneapolis, Minn. (Oct. 16, 1997).
179. See Morse & Zucker, supra note 30, at 473.
180. Branzburg,408 U.S. at 707 ("[Nlews gathering is not without its First
Amendment protections.").
18L See id. at 709 (Powell, J. concurring) (MThe Court does not hold that
newsmen.., are without constitutional rights with respect to the gathering of

news or in safeguarding their sources.").
182. See United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980).
The court stated:

1594

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:1563

closure of nonconfidential information threatened the free flow
of information, much like confidential sources.'83 Protecting
confidential sources was not the sole concern of the courts and
media reformers at the time the Minnesota Shield Law was
enacted.
Furthermore, several of the shield laws adopted in other
states in the wake of Branzburg included broad protection for
both published and unpublished information.8 In fact, only
one state clearly limited coverage to confidential sources and
information. 5 Most states did not distinguish between confidential and nonconfidential information, but provided for
broad protection against compelled disclosure.'86 At least one
state supreme court declined to read the word "confidential"
into that state's generally-worded statute, finding that the
legislature intended to provide broad protection to reporters in
reaction to the Branzburg decision. 87 The Turner court's asWe do not think that the privilege can be limited solely to protection of sources. The compelled production of a reporter's resource
materials can constitute a significant intrusion into the newsgathering and editorial processes. Like the compelled disclosure of confidential sources, it may substantially undercut the public policy favoring the free flow of information to the public that is the foundation
for the privilege.
Id. (citation omitted).
183. See id.
184. Nine states passed shield laws in the next few years following the
Branzburg decision. They were Delaware, Illinois, Minnesota, Nebraska,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Tennessee.
185. See R.I. STAT. § 9-19.1-2 (1997) ("N~o person shall be required ... to
reveal confidential association, to disclose any confidential information, or to
disclose the source of any confidential information received or obtained by
him ... in his... capacity as a reporter, editor, commentator, journalist,
writer, correspondent, newsphotographer .
").
186. See, e.g., NEB. STAT. § 20-144 (1991) ("[Newspersons] shall be encouraged to gather, write, edit, or disseminate news or other information vigorously so that the public may be fully informed.... [Compelling such persons
to disclose a source of information or disclose unpublished information is contrary to the pubic interest and inhibits the free flow of information to the
public."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980) ("A person engaged in gathering
information for publication or broadcast connected with or employed by the
news media or press ... shall not be required... to disclose ... any information or the source of any information procured for publication or broadcast."
(emphasis added)). For similar statutes, see N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2
(1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 12 § 2506B (West 1993); OR. REV. STAT. §
44.520 (1988).
187. See Austin v. Memphis Publishing Co., 655 S.W.2d 146 (Tenn. 1983)
(upholding state statutory protection for nonconfidential information in
wrongful death case where newspaper was a third party).
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sertion that the statute was directed only at confidential
sources is, therefore, subject to dispute.
The Turner court, in short, erred in adopting the Heaslip
court's narrow interpretation of the Minnesota Shield Law and
overturning more than two decades of lower court precedent
that extended protection to published and unpublished information, confidential and nonconfidential material. By relying
on a "finely tuned" textual interpretation, the Court also failed
to adequately consider the broad purpose of the statute,
drafted in response to the heightened concerns of the late sixties over governmental intrusions on a free press.
C. RESTORING THE SHIELD
To restore protection for newsgathering in Minnesota, the
legislature should follow the path taken by at least three other
states that strengthened their shield laws in response to interpretations by their courts that narrowed protection for the
press.'88 The state should amend the Free Flow of Information
Act to expand reporter privilege to specifically include protection for nonconfidential information. It must establish a
threshold requirement that is set high enough to prevent
frivolous, irrelevant, and nonessential subpoenas, while leaving
enough flexibility for the court to weigh competing, compelling
interests.
The Minnesota Joint Media Committee,'89 working with
legislators in both the House and Senate, have proposed
changing section 525.023'10 so that newspersons would not be
188. New York and New Jersey have strengthened their shield laws, while
California passed an amendment to the state constitution. See Morse &
Zucker, supra note 30 at 427; DIENES ET AL., supra note 29, at 650 n.17, 651.
189. The Minnesota Joint Media Committee, organized in 1973, is composed of groups and individuals representing media interests on First
Amendment and media access issues. Its membership includes the Minnesota
Newspaper Association, the Society of Professional Journalists, the Minnesota
Broadcasters Association, the Neighborhood Press Association, the Silha Center for the Study of Media Ethics and Law, the Associated Press, as well as
individual media organizations.
190. § 595.023 would read:
No person who is ... engaged in the gathering ... or publishing
of information... for... publication to the public shall be re-

quired... to disclose in any proceeding the person or means from or
through which information was obtained, or to disclose any unpublished information.., or any of the person's notes, memoranda, recording tapes, film or other reportorial data whether or not it would
tend to identify the person ... through which the information was obtained.
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required to disclose either confidential or nonconfidential information.19 This proposed change would enable the courts in
Minnesota to more closely follow standards that reflect the position reached by the majority of federal courts and would afford protection to competing constitutional rights.
In addition, the legislature should establish guidelines
with a threshold standard for when in camera review can be
compelled, and a process by which the parties may be heard
within that procedure. New Jersey has such a provision in its
Shield Law, which requires a showing by a preponderance of
the evidence before in camera review is ordered, that the information is relevant, material, necessary, and unavailable
from a less intrusive source. 9 This provision can serve as a
useful model for Minnesota because it reduces intrusion on
newsgathering by requiring a balancing test before disclosure
is compelled. That process should eliminate frivolous and nonessential subpoenas and reduce governmental intrusion in the
editorial process. It will also assist the court in its review, both
by focusing on items of relevance and by permitting the press
to set forth its First Amendment concerns on particular items
under review.
CONCLUSION
As a result of the Turner decision, reporter information in
Minnesota is provided only narrow protection against compelled disclosure in a wide variety of both civil and criminal
cases. This decision dramatically changes the previous protections afforded reporters in Minnesota under both constitutional
and statutory interpretations, is out of step with the great majority of federal courts, and poses a serious threat to a vigorous,
responsible, and independent press. By limiting the "shield" to
confidential information and sources, and declining to require
a threshold showing of relevance, materiality and need, the
decision leaves the press vulnerable to a significant increase in
the number and scope of subpoenas, which, in turn, threatens
to impede the media's newsgathering and reporting capabilities.
The Minnesota Shield Law, enacted in 1973 to ensure the
"free flow of information," should be amended to expand re19L See S. 1480, 80th Leg., (Minn. 1998); H.R. 1668, 80th Leg., (Minm.
1998). The proposed bill also includes some clarifying language to § 595.024
regarding the threshold requirement for disclosure.
192. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21.4 (West 1994).
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porter privilege to specifically include nonconfidential information which would be protected against compelled disclosure
absent the threshold showing required for confidential material.
Guidelines should also be established to regulate in camera
review of reportorial information, both confidential and nonconfidential. The goal of the proposed changes to the Minnesota Shield Law is not to immunize the press, nor to preclude
its cooperation when other compelling interests prevail, nor to
bestow on them a special status that is personal to the individual
reporter. Rather, the goal is to ensure that the legal system does
not impose impediments on the newsgathering process that
will interfere with the aggressive, vigorous, and responsible
reporting that enables us to be informed participants in this
democracy.
The impact of restraints on the press are not always apparent to the public. As an institution, the media has garnered
many critics who condemn its errors and its excesses. Much of
this criticism is merited. But unless the public is willing to
recognize the changing nature of the forces that are impeding
the newsgathering process, and provide appropriate protection
from frivolous, irrelevant, or nonessential subpoenas, those
who remain in the responsible press will spend less of their
time on the street and more time in court.

